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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the notion of ‘pockets of effectiveness’ in the light of the theo-
risation of regulated neopatrimonialism. The attention to pockets of effectiveness 
– understood as public organisations which deliver public goods and services rela-
tively effectively in contexts of largely ineffective government – adds to the unders-
tanding of regulated neopatrimonialism by focusing on the conditions under which 
conditions public sector organisations may contribute to development.
The literature emphasises that two sets of factors contribute to the creation of poc-
kets of effectiveness. Contextual political-economic factors relate to: political pro-
cesses, political institutions and material interests and power positions of social 
groups. Internal factors concern organisational leadership and management, and 
the functions and attributes of organisations.
The paper analyses the operations of several oil and gas companies in Russia and 
Kazakhstan in order to see how these firms are influenced by their political-econo-
mic environment and how they manage, or fail, to establish developmental poten-
tial. Russia’s political system is an example of regulated neopatrimonialism, while 
Kazakhstan is an example of a predatory form of neopatrimonialism. The paper 
concludes that the establishment of pockets of effectiveness in post-Soviet countries 
is rather difficult but not impossible in the case of Russia. The relative success of 
certain companies seems to result from the leadership’s adjustment to external 
political-economic realities and the establishment of a modus vivendi with the 
incumbent regime.
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companies
* I would like to thank Daniel Bach and Caroline Dufy of the Centre Émile 
Durkheim, as well as Aad Correljé (Delft University of Technology and 
Clingendael International Energy Programme) for their useful comments on 
an earlier version of this paper. This paper was written for a special issue of the 
Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée; the comments of two anonymous 
reviewers of the original submission are gratefully acknowledged.
Néo-patrimonialisme et développement : 
les poches d’efficacité comme pilotes du 
changement
Résumé
Cet article revient sur la notion de « poche d’efficacité » à la lumière de l’approche 
théorique du néo-patrimonialisme régulé. L’attention portée aux poches d’efficacité 
– au sens d’organisations publiques délivrant des biens et services publics de façon 
relativement efficace dans un contexte de gouvernements largement inefficaces – 
contribue à la compréhension du néo-patrimonialisme régulé en se concentrant sur 
les conditions dans lesquelles les organisations du secteur public peuvent contri-
buer au développement. La littérature sur le sujet souligne que deux ensembles de 
facteurs contribuent à l’émergence de poches d’efficacité. Les facteurs contextuels 
politico-économiques renvoient aux processus politiques, aux institutions poli-
tiques, aux intérêts matériels et aux positions de pouvoir des groupes sociaux. Les 
facteurs internes concernent le leadership et le management organisationnels, et 
les fonctions et les attributs des organisations. L’article analyse les opérations de 
plusieurs compagnies de pétrole et de gaz en Russie et au Kazakhstan afin de voir 
dans quelle mesure ces firmes sont influencées par leur environnement politico-
économique, et la façon dont elles réussissent – ou pas - à construire un potentiel de 
développement. Le système politique russe est un exemple de néo-patrimonialisme 
régulé, alors que le système kazakh renverrait à une forme de néo-patrimonialisme 
prédateur. L’article conclut que l’établissement de poches d’efficacité dans les pays 
post-soviétiques est difficile, mais pas impossible, du moins dans le cas russe. Le 
succès relatif de certaines firmes semble ainsi résulter de l’ajustement du leadership 
aux réalités politico-économiques externes et à la mise en place d’un modus viven-
di avec le régime en place.
Mots clés
 néo-patrimonialisme, poches d’efficacité, Russie, Kazakhstan, compagnies pétro-
lières et gazières
i
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1. INTRODUCTION
Under the influence of the dominant neo-institutional 
approach to politics and economics, contemporary accounts of 
development tend to be cast almost exclusively in terms of the 
institutional frameworks governing societies and economies 
(Sangmpam, 2007).  The nature of the state has traditionally 
played an important role in neo-institutional explanations of 
development. In particular, the distinction between so-called 
‘developmental’ and ‘predatory’ states has been a frequent 
point of reference in the debate on development outcomes1. 
In Peter Evans’ words, developmental states ‘foster long-term 
entrepreneurial perspectives among private elites by increasing 
incentives to engage in transformative investments and lowering 
the risks’, while predatory states ‘extract such large amounts of 
otherwise investable surplus while providing so little in the way of 
“collective goods” in return that they do indeed impede economic 
transformation’ (Evans, 1996: 44). 
Although Evans included a third category in the ‘heuristic’ 
continuum from developmental to predatory states, and thus 
acknowledged the need for more complex theorising of the 
relationship between the nature of the state and development, his 
typology remained quite vague on the nature of what he called 
‘other apparatuses, intermediary states whose developmental 
impact is more ambiguous’ (Evans, 1989: 563). Evans’ critics 
pointed out that his approach seemed to collapse the (neo)
patrimonial category too easily with that of the predatory 
state, thus leaving out ‘important elements of variation among 
patrimonial polities’ (Hutchcroft, 1998: 57). A more recent 
account of the need to theorise the intermediary category was 
provided by Daniel Bach, who coined the term ‘regulated 
1 Seminal publications in this regard are: Evans P., 1989, and Evans P., 1996.
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neopatrimonialism’ and distinguished this from ‘predatory 
forms of neopatrimonialism’, which are close to or identical 
with Evans’ category of the patrimonial state. Bach’s regulated 
neopatrimonialism can be interpreted as ‘neopatrimonialism 
within the state’, while predatory forms relate to ‘patterns of 
neopatrimonialism that permeate the entire state’. Regulated 
neopatrimonialism, according to Bach, allows some independent 
‘capacity to craft “public” policies’ (Bach, 2012). 
This paper argues that, apart from addressing the empirical 
problems following from the distinction between developmental 
and predatory forms of state, there is another reason why the 
analytical category suggested by Bach is important. Whereas the 
theorisation on predatory versus developmental states, as well as 
neopatrimonialism, seems to have focused almost exclusively at 
the macro-level (in particular, the form of the state in relation 
to society and the economy), Bach’s category of regulated 
neopatrimonialism allows for the analysis of meso- and micro-
level phenomena. As a result of the use of this category, more 
emphasis can be placed on agency and leadership. Focusing on the 
limits of structural and institutional explanations of development 
problems, Adrian Leftwich has criticised these explanations for 
failing to see ‘the important success stories which run against 
the general patterns of institutional failure’ (Leftwich, 2010: 93). 
Such success stories, Leftwich argued, can be understood only by 
paying attention to ‘human agency – that means the politics of 
development – and in particular to the interactions of leaders and 
elites who dominate political, economic, military, communal, 
trade union, regional and ethnic interests, organizations and 
sectors in most polities’ (Leftwich, 2010: 95). 
This paper focuses on so-called ‘pockets of effectiveness’2 
(Roll,  2013: 1) that exist in neopatrimonial contexts. Pockets of 
2  This term is used in conformity with Roll, who points out that alternative terms – 
such as ‘pockets of productivity’, ‘pockets of efficiency’ and ‘islands of effectiveness’ 
have been used elsewhere in the literature to denote similar phenomena.
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effectiveness, as noted by Michael Roll, are ‘public organisations 
which deliver public goods and services relatively effectively 
in contexts of largely ineffective government’ (Roll, 2013: 1). 
The paper argues that the attention to pockets of effectiveness 
complements the theorisation of regulated neopatrimonialism by 
specifying under which conditions certain parts of the public sector 
may spur development. In this way, the pockets of effectiveness 
notion brings a dynamic element into a debate that tends to be 
dominated by ‘comparative statics’ (non-developmental versus 
developmental regimes). The focus on the conditions under 
which pockets of effectiveness can prosper adds value to our 
understanding of development as a social, political and economic 
project. In the context of this volume, it is the external impact of 
the pockets of effectiveness that is important: it is not so much the 
effectiveness per se of public organisations that matters here, but 
rather their ability, under certain circumstances, to act as agents 
of development. 
The paper consists of five sections. The next section presents the 
notion of pockets of effectiveness, which are defined in terms of 
their internal features and relations to the external environment. 
Section 3 discusses what seem to be the main conditions for the 
establishment and strengthening of pockets of effectiveness, 
particularly in situations of neopatrimonialism within the state. 
The fourth section moves on to analyse several oil and gas 
companies in the post-Soviet republics. The objective of this 
section is to see to what extent the establishment of pockets of 
(relative) effectiveness is feasible in the oil and gas sector, which 
is generally perceived to be highly susceptible to rent-seeking 
behaviour and patrimonial politics. Section 5 contains the 
conclusions of the paper.
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2. POCKETS OF EFFECTIVENESS
The concept of pockets of effectiveness has been around for a few 
decades. Initially coined by scholars working on Brazil, the term 
has later also been shown to be applicable to actors and processes 
in the African, Caribbean and Middle Eastern context3. Given the 
definition that was provided above, pockets of effectiveness need 
to be understood both in terms of their internal characteristics 
and in relation to their environment.
Internally, pockets of effectiveness are driven by the commitment 
of its members and leadership to provide goods and/or services 
that have a wider impact than just the organisation they are 
working for. The activities of institutions that are claimed to be 
pockets of effectiveness thus have a clearly public dimension, no 
matter whether the organisations themselves are rooted in the 
public, private or third sector (e.g. Leonard, 2010: 92-93). The 
ultimate motivation of the institutions need not be intrinsically 
oriented to the ‘common good’: private actors, whose commercial 
activities produce positive externalities and thus contribute to 
the provision of goods and/or services that spread throughout 
the public realm, can equally well be understood as pockets of 
effectiveness as can public-sector institutions.
This understanding of the internal characteristics of pockets of 
effectiveness is important in view of the relationship between 
the organisations and their environment. The extent to which 
the organisations can be considered as ‘effective’ sets them apart 
from the ‘ineffective’ context they are operating in. This implies 
that the level of performance of the organisations is not the 
rule in the societies they are part of, but rather the exception. 
3  Cf. the analyses of the Brazilian National Development Bank in Schneider B., 1987, 
p. 228-229; Evans P.B., op. cit., 1989, p. 577; and Geddes B., 1990, p. 225-229. For 
other contexts, see Owosu F., 2006, p. 471-485;  Hout W., 2007, p. 1333-1352; and 
Hertog S., 2010, p. 261-301.
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As David Leonard had phrased it, pockets of effectiveness are 
significant because they are functioning against the backdrop of 
‘weak governance states’ (Leonard, 2010). In general, weak (or 
‘bad’ [Moore , 2001: 385-418]) governance relates to situations 
in which the government is incapable or unwilling to provide 
public goods – in other words, situations where public policies 
are deficient. Government incapability is usually the result of 
breakdown of the state machinery (as in ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ 
states) as a consequence of massive internal conflict or major 
natural disasters. Government unwillingness is typically caused 
by capture of the state machinery by particular groups, who turn 
the state into an instrument to serve their interests rather than 
the ‘common good’.
The use of the state machinery to serve private interests can take 
different forms, as was alluded to above. The most extreme cases – 
which can be conceptualised, in reference to Bach’s interpretation 
(Bach, 2012: 31), as the ‘patrimonialisation of the entire state’ – 
offer very little scope for publicly oriented action. These cases can 
be thought of, in the words of Robert Jackson, as ‘quasi-states’, 
which are more a personal- or primordial-favoring political 
arrangement than a public-regarding realm. Government is less 
an agency to provide political goods such as law, order, security, 
justice, or welfare and more a fountain of privilege, wealth, and 
power for a small elite who control it. … Those who occupy state 
offices, civilian and military, high and low, are inclined to treat 
them as possessions rather than positions: to live off their rents – 
very luxuriously in some cases – and use them to reward persons 
and cliques who help maintain their power (Jackson, 1987: 527-
528). 
Usually, such extreme forms of patrimonialisation can survive 
only because the state has external sources of revenues, and is not 
subjected to accountability mechanisms that are enforced by the 
citizens. Rents deriving from natural resources (such as oil, gas or 
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mining), import or export duties, and foreign assistance are usual 
sources for governments to maintain their support base among 
particular social groups (e.g. Ross, 2012: 67-71; Moore, 2002: 
106). In such contexts, organisations are unlikely to obtain the 
independence and autonomy required to develop into genuine 
pockets of effectiveness.
In less extreme cases of patrimonialisation – referred to as 
‘neopatrimonialism within the state’ (Bach, 2012: 31) – the 
state will likely be dependent on taxation for at least part of its 
resources. As a consequence, accountability mechanisms will 
most probably be stronger, and there will be greater opportunity 
for organisations to claim autonomy from the state (Moore, 
2002). It is under these circumstances, if at all, that the likelihood 
of pockets of effectiveness is greatest (Leonard, 2010: 97). 
3. CONDITIONS FOR  POCKETS OF EFFECTIVENESS
The academic literature of the past decades contains a good 
number of analyses of pockets of effectiveness that came into 
being despite the adverse circumstances in the political-economic 
system they originated from. An inventory of a large number of 
case studies made recently by David Leonard has attempted to 
draw out five sets of ‘meta-hypotheses’ concerning the conditions 
under which pockets of effectiveness originate and continue to 
flourish. Leonard has arranged the five hypotheses into two broad 
categories, which comprise (a) factors related to the ‘contextual 
political economy’ and (b) internal factors contributing to 
effectiveness.
The contextual political-economic factors are divided into three 
groups by Leonard: political processes, political institutions and 
the underlying political economy. The three groups differ as to 
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the degree to which they can be manipulated (Leonard, 2010: 
97-98). Political-economy factors, which are related to material 
interests and power positions of social groups, seem to be most 
deeply ingrained in the social order, and hence least likely to 
change. Political institutions – understood as durable patterns of 
behaviour and organisation of the political process – are likewise 
resistant to change, and thus tend to have long-lasting impacts 
on political processes. Of the three contextual political-economic 
variables mentioned by Leonard, political processes are most 
clearly influenced by the preferences of political actors. Leonard 
argues, pace Grindle, that ‘agency leaders and reformers have 
more room for manoeuvre here than many believe (although 
institutions and political economy must constrain them and 
heavily influence who is in a position to what to do what).’ 
(Leonard, 2010: 98)
As argued in section 2 above, contextual factors play a crucial 
role in the establishment of pockets of effectiveness. In terms 
of the causal order among the factors, Leonard argues that ‘[m]
ost social scientists would hold that political economy … shapes 
institutions … and processes/strategies’ (Leonard, 2010: 99) and 
that the latter two variables tend to explain to a large extent the fate 
of pockets of effectiveness. Pervasive forms of neopatrimonialism, 
which permeate large sections of the state, may thus be 
inimical to the functioning of pockets of effectiveness. In cases 
where good leadership leads to the establishment of dynamic 
institutions, contextual factors may hinder their flourishing as 
they have created the circumstances in which powerful forces can 
successfully lay their hands on the rents that are being generated 
in effective entities. This implies that pockets of effectiveness are 
inherently unstable, as developments in their political-economic 
environment may impact on their survival.
A case in point is the fate of what is perhaps the archetypal pocket of 
effectiveness, the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDE), 
9 Cahiers du Centre Emile Durkheim Working Papers  [16]
that was analysed in an articles by Barbara Geddes (Geddes, 1990). 
The result of an effort to create greater capacity in the Brazilian 
bureaucracy in order to bolster national development, BNDE was 
an example of a set of independent agencies that were directly 
accountable only to the executive. Intended to become one of the 
‘bolsões de eficiência’ (pockets of efficiency), BNDE was created 
in 1952 under the presidency of Getúlio Vargas ‘as a new agency, 
outside the federal bureaucracy, to try to decrease the ability of 
politicians to use funds for partisan purposes’ (Geddes, 1990: 
226). In the late 1950s, under Vargas’ successors in the presidency, 
the BNDE obtained major resources and turned into a major 
player in the implementation of economic development plans, 
by both supplying finance and imposing performance criteria on 
other agencies involved in the execution of development projects, 
with a doubling of Brazil’s industrial production as a result 
(Geddes, 1990: 225-229). The Brazilian innovation strategy of the 
1950s disintegrated, according to Geddes, under president João 
Goulart. The tide turned against the BNDE, as Goulart did not 
support the independent agencies and subjected them again to 
traditional patronage conditions. The consequence of the policy 
change was ‘a fall in performance as competence in the agency 
declined and as political decision criteria superseded economic 
decision criteria’ (Geddes, 1990: 230). 
Internal factors related to pockets of effectiveness play a role 
against the background of the contextual factors discussed in the 
first part of this section. The two meta-hypotheses formulated 
by Leonard in relation to internal variables focus on leadership 
and management, and organisations’ functions and attributes. 
The understanding of the role of leadership and management in 
accounts of pockets of effectiveness often refer to the Weberian 
notion of rational-legal authority (Weber, 1978: 218-220). 
Inspired by Weber, interpretations emphasise expertise, rules, 
hierarchy and the absence of self-interests as vital preconditions 
for the development of effective leadership qualities and the 
10 [16] Cahiers du Centre Emile Durkheim Working Papers  
formulation of effective organisational missions.
According to Leonard, organisations require a mission that is 
formulated in terms of providing public goods or developing public 
policies in order to become genuine pockets of effectiveness,. 
Likewise, they need leadership that is committed to the public goals 
set for the organisations. As to the prerequisites for the success of 
organisations, Leonard’s synthesis of the literature points at the 
importance of the way in which these organisations are managed. 
Leadership, personnel management, resource mobilisation and 
organisational adaptation are, in his view, conditiones sine qua 
non for the rise and persistence of pockets of effectiveness: ‘An 
organisation’s “effectiveness” is largely determined by how it does 
its tasks—i.e. by management and leadership—not primarily by 
its function or its political context’ (Leonard, 2010: 94). Next 
to the previous factors, Leonard emphasises that pockets of 
effectiveness often possess ‘a pool of potential agency leaders 
who can act as “organisational entrepreneurs” to pull together 
the facilitating resources in the agency’s internal and external 
environment and who have attributes that give them some degree 
of autonomy from political predation’ (Leonard, 2010: 95). 
The role that leadership, expertise and political insulation have 
played in concrete pockets of effectiveness is clearly visible in 
the case of the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDE), 
the fate of which was described above. An important element in 
the success of BNDE during Juscelino Kubitschek’s presidency 
between 1955 and 1961 was the Bank’s emphasis of ‘global 
rationality’, in contrast to ‘political’ and ‘short-term’ rationality. 
Global rationality was aimed at the maximisation of growth by 
strengthening Brazilian industry, and was driven by highly-skilled 
functionaries in the organisation (Geddes, 1990: 227).Together 
with a set of other agencies within the Brazilian government, the 
BNDE was responsible for the successful achievement of a range 
of development targets related to, among others, the capacity 
11 Cahiers du Centre Emile Durkheim Working Papers  [16]
increase of electrical production and petroleum refining, the 
construction of roads and the improvement of wheat production 
(Geddes, 1990: 228).  A major success factor, according to Geddes, 
was the fact that ‘Kubitschek insulated the agencies crucial to 
the implementation of his development goals from those same 
clientelistic pressures in order to insure their competence and to 
secure steady and adequate investment for economic projects’ 
(Geddes, 1990: 229). 
4. HOW (UN)LIKELY ARE POCKETS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
IN THE POST-SOVIET CONTEXT? OIL AND GAS 
COMPANIES IN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN
Many analysts have emphasised that natural resource wealth 
has traditionally been an important source of rent-seeking and 
conflict. According to this literature natural resources have often 
turned out to be a ‘curse’ for national economies rather than a 
source of joy – hence the term ‘resource curse’ (Ross, 2012). In 
general, as was pointed out in section 2 above, the transmission 
mechanism of the resource curse is felt to be the lack of 
government accountability. As it was phrased by Ross, ‘when 
governments gain most of their revenues from external sources, 
such as resource rents or foreign assistance, they are freed from 
the need to levy domestic taxes and become less accountable to 
the societies they govern’ (Ross, 1999: 312). The impact of external 
wealth on the public sector is generally felt to be pernicious: 
states that are oriented towards rent-seeking tend to be weak and 
relatively ineffective, since they lack the incentives ‘to reduce the 
influence of patrimonial principles and personal linkages when 
recruiting and managing the public service’ (Moore, 2002: 316). 
 
The dominance of the economy by extractive industries, as 
in the mining or oil sector, is felt to have crucial impacts on 
12 [16] Cahiers du Centre Emile Durkheim Working Papers  
development outcomes and characteristics of the state in many 
developing countries. Michael Shafer, among others, has pointed 
out that rent-seeking practices are rife among the governments 
of so-called mining states, such as Zambia (Shafer, 1994: 10, 23-
24). The features of the mining sector, such as the high degree of 
capital intensity, the importance of economies of scale, and the 
inflexibility of the factors of production, make the sector a source 
of monopoly rents that are ‘easily tapped by the state’ (Shafer, 
1994: 35). The amount of rents derived from a single natural 
resource, often exploited in an industrial enclave dominated 
by foreign capital, are often enormous. Such rents are generally 
unrelated to domestic industry and are controlled almost entirely 
by the state (Karl, 1997: 47-48). Countries with abundant 
hydrocarbon deposits occupy a special position among mining 
states since the scale and duration of the rents generated by the 
exploitation and export of oil and gas (and to a lesser extent, coal) 
are unprecedented for their governments (Karl, 1997: 49). 
The nature of oil and gas states, and particularly the size and 
pervasiveness of the economic rents deriving from the exploitation 
of natural resources, make them particularly interesting for 
analysing the establishment of pockets of effectiveness4. The 
remainder of this section attempts to analyse several oil and gas 
companies in the former Soviet Union (Russia and Kazakhstan, 
in particular) in order to see how the dynamics of these firms 
are influenced by their political-economic environment and how 
they manage, or fail, to establish developmental potential. 
The former Soviet republics making up the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) are an extraordinary source of oil and 
4  Jones Luong and Weinthal have made the important point that the type of ownership 
structures that are chosen for the management of mineral wealth seem to mediate 
between resource abundance and institutional weaknesses, particularly of the fiscal 
regime (see Jones Luong P. and Weinthal E., 2010). This point is related to the argument 
made in this paper, but essentially addresses a different issue, as the focus here is limited 
to the conditions that facilitate or hamper the creation of pockets of effectiveness in the 
context of particular political regimes.
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gas. Five of the eleven member-states are among the 48 leading 
countries in terms of proved oil reserves, while six of the countries 
are among the top-50 of proved gas deposits. Among the CIS states, 
Russia is the leading country when it comes to proved oil and gas 
reserves; the country is the world’s eighth main source of proved oil, 
and the world’s leading source of proved gas reserves. Kazakhstan 
is second to Russia in terms of oil reserves, and third to Russia and 
Turkmenistan in relation to gas reserves (BP, 2012: 6, 20). 
The political systems in Russia and Kazakhstan are both, despite 
their differences, clearly authoritarian in nature. Russia’s polity 
has been characterised by Margareta Mommsen as an example 
of ‘patronal presidentialism’, which is a hybrid of oligarchic and 
autocratic elements with a ‘total interpenetration of business 
and politics’ (Mommsen, 2012: 80-81). Kazakhstan has been 
described as a ‘post-Soviet rentier state’, which is dependent on 
the inflow of foreign revenues from the sale of oil and gas. The 
country is characterised by the political domination of a small elite 
around long-time president Nursultan Nazarbayev, which tries to 
maintain its hold on power and uses the country’s natural resource 
rents for its own purposes as well as to garner support from the 
population (Franke, Gawrich and Alakbarov, 2009: 124-133). 
The national oil and gas company of Kazakhstan, KazMunaiGaz, 
was established by presidential decree in 2002 in order to 
enhance government control of natural resource production 
and increase the production of oil and gas (Olcott, 2007: 7-9). 
KazMunaiGaz controls the important oil and gas producing 
company KMG Exploration and Production, of which it owns 62 
per cent of the shares, as well as KazTransOil and KazTransGaz, 
the country’s largest oil and gas transporters, where it is the only 
shareholder (Olcott, 2007: 20-22; Palazuelos and Fernandez, 
2012: 32). KazMunaiGaz is governed by a Board of Directors, in 
which president Nazarbayev’s son-in-law and nephew, next to 
other members of the ruling elite have been playing crucial roles 
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(Olcott, 2007: 20-22; Franke et al., 2009: 126). Despite its official 
policy of privatisation and liberalisation, Kazakhstan has also 
known a ‘renationalisation’ process, the objective of which was to 
increase government control over the economy. The enforcement 
of a minimum property share of joint ventures for KazMunaiGaz 
and the imposition of production-sharing agreements5 were key 
elements of this policy (Libman, 2013: 9-10; Olcott, 2007: 24). 
Importantly, the Kazakh National Fund, created in 2001, is used 
to deposit a large share of national oil revenues and is reported to 
have increased to over US$27 billion, or more than 20 per cent 
of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product, by 2008. The fund is 
controlled by president Nazarbayev, without effective oversight 
from Parliament, thus opening up the possibility for it to be used 
for outright political purposes (Palazuelos and Fernandez, 2012: 
33; Franke et al., 2009: 129-130). 
Rosneft is a Russian state-owned oil corporation that emerged 
out of the Soviet Ministry of Oil Industry after the demise of 
the USSR. The firm was established to manage the stakes of the 
Russian state in 259 oil companies (out of some 300) that were 
operating in Russia at the time (Poussenkova, 2007: 3). Rosneft led 
a dwindling existence during most of the 1990s, leading Russian 
oil expert Nina Poussenkova to characterise the corporation 
as a minor player and one of the least efficient oil companies 
around the turn of the century (Poussenkova, 2007: 11). Rosneft, 
which escaped from the wave of privatisation in the Russian oil 
industry at the end of the 1990s – partly, it seems, because of its 
poor performance – subsequently became a useful vehicle for the 
political objectives of the new regime under Vladimir Putin. Putin 
emphasised the need for the Russian state to use the country’s 
raw materials to generate economic growth and used Rosneft 
and its energy resources as ‘a catalyst for establishing a greater 
5 Production-sharing agreements are contracts on the sharing of oil revenues between 
national governments or national oil companies and foreign corporations. The latter 
corporations are typically responsible for the actual exploration and exploitation of oil 
sites. Cf. Bindemann K., 1999, p. 13-18.
15 Cahiers du Centre Emile Durkheim Working Papers  [16]
role for Russia in the global economy’ (Henderson, 2012: 2, 6). 
Rosneft subsequently became an instrument of the Russian state 
as ‘a political phenomenon rather than an oil and gas company’6. 
The firm was allowed, as a state corporation7, to set the rules on 
production-sharing agreements and licenses in such a way that it 
could accumulate many oil production sites from the Arctic shelf 
to East Siberia. It played an important role in politically motivated 
projects in Kazakhstan, China, Algeria and the Caspian Sea 
region, and served to limit the influence of foreign oil companies 
in the industry (Poussenkova, 2007: 44-51). Rosneft’s acquisition 
of Yuganskneftegas from the bankrupt estate of Yukos, financed 
behind the scenes by the Russian Ministry of Finance, made the 
corporation into Russia’s leading oil corporation and by 2010 into 
one of the world’s top ten oil producers (Poussenkova, 2007: 58-
66; Henderson, 2012: 1). 
The Russian gas sector is dominated by state-owned Gazprom, 
which has played a role vis-à-vis the Russian state that is highly 
similar to Rosneft’s (Mommsen, 2012: 77). Joint Stock Society 
Gazprom was created in 1992 as the successor to the Soviet 
Union’s Ministry of the Gas Industry by Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
who headed the Ministry at the time and became the company’s 
first CEO. As Prime Minister, Chernomyrdin granted Gazprom 
its monopoly on gas exploration, transport and export (Åslund, 
2010: 152-153). Gazprom’s operations are characterised by the 
pervasive impact of the Russian state; hence the frequently heard 
claim that ‘it is hard to determine where Gazprom ends and 
the Russian state begins’8. The government has systematically 
used its influence in Gazprom to keep domestic gas prices low 
for political purposes. Moreover, analysts note that President 
6 Analysts of Russian investment firm Antanta Capital cited in Poussenkova N., op. cit., 
2007, p. 78.
7 Rosneft was partially privatised in 2006, but the Russian state maintains a ‘super-
majority’ of the company’s equity, which implies that it can dictate strategic decisions 
(Henderson J., op. cit., 2012, p. 9).
8 P. Rutland cited in Jones Luong P. and Weinthal E., op. cit., 2010, p. 220.
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Putin has used the company’s resources for financing election 
campaigns, for attacking the media oligarchs who were critical of 
his way of ruling the country, and for expanding the state’s role 
in the economy by buying controlling state shares in mining and 
industrial companies (Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2010: 221-223). 
Next to the state-owned oil and gas corporations that seem to 
have served mainly as either a political instrument (Rosneft and 
Gazprom) or a tool of rent-seeking and patronage (KazMunaiGaz), 
some private oil companies appeared to have been much more 
dynamic and promising in terms of their developmental potential. 
When the breakup of the Soviet Union offered the possibility 
in the early 1990s for the creation of vertically integrated oil 
companies, both Yukos and Lukoil were established as mergers of 
various existing oil producers (Henderson and Radosevic, 2004: 
225). Yukos came under control of the financial holding Group 
Menatep, led by oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, while Lukoil 
was governed by Vagit Alekperov, Deputy Minister of Oil and 
Gas and director of one of three West Siberian oil producers that 
merged into Lukoil9. 
Yukos was widely perceived as a dynamic oil company, which 
succeeded in creating a centralised management structure, 
with one division responsible for oil production, with seven 
subsidiaries, a refining and marketing division and three financial 
subsidiaries (Henderson and Radosevic, 2004: 227-228). The 
company adopted Western-style management techniques and 
placed much emphasis on improving the skills of its employees 
(Dixon, Meyer and Day, 2007: 1493-1523). By 2003, Yukos 
produced almost 87 million tons of oil and explored expansion 
9 TNK-BP, which prides itself on being ‘a leading Russian oil company and … 
among the top ten privately-owned oil companies in the world in terms of crude oil 
production’, is not discussed here because the firm is effectively a Russian subsidiary 
of BP, which is owned for 50 per cent by a consortium of Russian investment, financial 
and industrial groups (see TNK-BP, ‘About TNK-BP’, http://tnk-bp.ru/en/company, 
accessed 7 December 2012).
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of its operations to the United States. In the same year, however, 
Yukos CEO Khodorkovsky came under attack from the Russian 
public prosecutor after he had confronted President Vladimir 
Putin on issues of corruption in the Russian state apparatus. 
Khodorkovsky was sentenced to jail in October 2003 after what 
many believe was a politically-inspired trial. Yukos went bankrupt 
and its assets were sold off. According to Poussenkova, ‘[t]he 
YUKOS case marked the beginning of the rapid nationalization 
of the Russian oil sector and aggressive redistribution of assets in 
favor of state-owned companies’ (Poussenkova, 2010: 110).
Since the demise of Yukos, Lukoil has meanwhile become 
Russia’s biggest oil company after state-owned Rosneft with a 
production of 90.9 million tons in 201110. In the twenty years 
of its existence, Lukoil has adopted a strategy of diversification 
and internationalisation. Next to the production of crude oil, 
the company has invested in refinery capacity and the setting 
up of service stations. Its presence in international markets 
focuses on upstream activities related to oil production in several 
former Soviet republics, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Azerbaijan, and oil exploration in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Colombia  and Venezuela. Lukoil’s downstream 
operations include refinery (as in Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine 
and The Netherlands) and the ownership of petrol stations (in the 
United States, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Finland) 
(Gorst, 2007: 20-32; Poussenkova, 2010: 105-109). 
Lukoil’s success in upstream and downstream expansion is not 
necessarily equalled by its operational success. When compared to 
other major oil companies, Lukoil’s technical efficiency (measured 
as the revenue generated from employees and oil reserves) is 
limited. Calculations by researchers from Rice University indicate 
that in 2004 Lukoil’s revenue per employee amounted to US$233 
10 Lukoil, ‘Oil Production’, http://www.lukoil.com/static_6_5id_254_.html, accessed 
15 April 2013.
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and its revenue per barrel of oil equivalent was US$1.68. This is 
well below the average realised by independent oil companies 
of, respectively US$1,629 per employee and US$11.24 per barrel 
(Eller, Hartley and Medlock, 2007: 11-12). Some indicators of 
Lukoil’s performance seem to suggest that the company is more 
successful than two government-dominated Russian companies. 
Lukoil’s profits as a percentage of assets compare positively to 
those realised by Rosneft and Gazprom: in 2009, Lukoil’s profits 
of US$9.51 billion equalled 16.1 per cent of its total assets, while 
Rosneft’s US$11.12 billion in profits was 14.4 per cent of asset 
value and Gazprom achieved 9.7 per cent profit (US$26.78 billion) 
(Filippov, 2010: 330). Other indicators indicate that Rosneft has 
recently been more successful in some respects than Lukoil, but 
this seems to be the result, at least to a considerable extent, by the 
fact that national oil company Rosneft is favoured by the state 
with regard to tax payments and the giving out of new licences 
(Henderson, 2012: 17-20). 
 
In terms of its management performance, Lukoil seems to compare 
favourably to other (state-owned) Russian oil companies. As 
pointed out by James Henderson and Slado Radosevic, Lukoil 
was leading industrial restructuring in the second half of the 
1990s. The company managed to bring its subsidiaries into 
one single entity and thereby managed to control its overall 
cash flows. Overall coordination among the various parts of 
the organisation, however, remained a weakness within Lukoil. 
Comparing Lukoil to Yukos, its main competitor of the early 21st 
century, Henderson and Radosevic point out that the former’s 
production costs per barrel of oil were far higher than the latter’s 
(Henderson and Radosevic, 2004: 226-229). As indicated by 
three analysts of management techniques, Lukoil displayed 
more openness to modern management skills, but ‘still lagged 
far behind the western-style companies’ such as Yukos (Dixon, 
Meyer and Day, 2007: 1511). 
The fate of Lukoil and Yukos in the first decade of this century 
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could hardly be more different. While Yukos went bankrupt, 
Lukoil’s Vagit Alekperov cooperated with the Russian leadership 
and maintained a degree of relative autonomy. Lukoil established 
itself formally as a private enterprise, when the last government-
owned shares were sold to ConocoPhillips in 2004 (Poussenkova, 
2010: 110; Gorst, 2007: 40). Lukoil’s leadership seems very 
responsive to government priorities and appears to operate with 
the explicit agreement of the Russian authorities (Filippov, 2010: 
322). For instance, Lukoil cooperated with the Russian government 
on the issue of gasoline pricing by not increasing prices in 2005 
and managed to avoid Western takeover of refineries in Eastern 
Europe by buying up these plants ahead of US- and EU-based 
companies (Gorst, 2007: 28-29). 
 
The above discussion suggests that the room for the establishment 
of pockets of effectiveness in post-Soviet countries is rather 
limited. To the extent that a company such as Lukoil has proved 
to be successful, the company’s accomplishments and relative 
autonomy seem to have been the result of the leadership’s 
realisation that adjustment to the external political-economic 
reality brings benefits. As a corporate entity, the company is 
relatively successful – particularly in the light of Yukos’ demise 
and the use of state-owned Rosneft and KazMunaiGaz for outright 
political or clientelistic purposes – and may be seen as a pocket 
of relative effectiveness11. In the highly politicised environment of 
contemporary Russia, the firm’s understanding of the balance of 
power seems to be crucial for its flourishing.
11 James Henderson’s analysis of Rosneft seems to suggest that also this company may 
in the future be allowed greater independence from the Russian state, manifested in its 
governance structure and further privatisation. Coupled with its attempt to implement 
new technologies, this may lead Rosneft to acquire more features of a pocket of relative 
effectiveness. Writing in early 2012, Henderson does warn about too high expectations 
on Rosneft’s potential, as the informal influence of the Russian state remains very 
significant (Henderson J., op. cit., 2012, p. 49, 55).
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5. CONCLUSION
The focus of this paper has been on the emergence of so-
called pockets of effectiveness in situations of regulated 
neopatrimonialism, where certain domains within the state 
become victim of particular specific interests but the independent 
capacity for formulating public policies is still remaining intact. It 
was argued that the pocket of effectiveness concept can be useful 
to shed light on the dynamics in ‘non-developmental’ states, 
where  developmentally oriented actors aim at providing goods 
or services with a broader social impact beyond the organisation 
they are employed in. Particularly, cases of ‘neopatrimonialism 
within the state’ where citizens can hold the state accountable 
for the use of tax revenues would seem to offer possibilities for 
organisations to claim autonomy from the state and develop into 
pockets of effectiveness.
 
In an attempt to distinguish between different analytical categories, 
two main sets of conditions for the emergence of pockets of 
effectiveness were discussed above. On the basis of David Leonard’s 
synthesising work, a distinction was made between contextual 
political-economic factors and internal factors contributing to 
effectiveness. Political-economic characteristics – concerning 
political processes, political institutions and the structure of 
interests and power – were felt to be important conditions for the 
creation of pockets of effectiveness. The contribution of internal 
factors, concerning organisational leadership and management, 
and organisations’ functions and attributes, was seen as a likely 
sine qua non for the coming into being of pockets of effectiveness.
 
In terms of the social and political contexts, the experiences 
of natural resource producers in Russia and Kazakhstan seem 
to suggest that there is some, yet limited, space for pockets of 
effectiveness to emerge in the post-Soviet sphere. The examples 
of state-owned oil and gas companies in both cases illustrate that 
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it is difficult to escape from the grip of dominant political forces, 
which attempt to make their operations subservient to the interests 
of the ruling elite, as in the case of neopatrimonial Kazakhstan, 
and of the wielders of state power, as in presidential Russia. The 
experience of Russian Lukoil seems to suggest that there is some 
leverage for companies if they understand how to deal with the 
country’s political power holders and find a working relationship 
with the incumbent regime. The relative success of such cases 
remains, however, unstable and is ultimately dependent on their 
ability to negotiate some autonomy from the state. 
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